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RESUMEN 
Este artículo evalúa la efectividad de los subsidios regionales a la creación de 
empleo indefinido y para ello hace uso de la información contenida en la Muestra 
Continua de Vidas Laborales. Esta base de datos, usada aquí por primera vez para 
hacer evaluación de políticas sociolaborales, ofrece el historial laboral completo de 
más de un millón de trabajadores españoles, si problemas de agregación ni de 
censuras. La política que analizamos consiste en un subsidio pagado al inicio del 
contrato indefinido y que se ofrece por algunas comunidades autónomas para los 
nuevos contratos indefinidos firmados con trabajadores temporales y con los 
desempleados. Debido a que la política tiene variabilidad temporal, individual y 
regional, podemos aplicar una técnica de triples diferencias que identifica el efecto 
medio del tratamiento de dicha política. Nuestra principal conclusión es que el flujo a 
empleos indefinidos de los trabajadores elegibles por esta política cambia solo 
mínimamente. El efecto, no obstante, es mayor para trabajadores temporales que 
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This article evaluates the effectiveness of regional wage subsidies to foster 
permanent employment using information gathered from the “Muestra Continua de 
Vidas Laborales”. This dataset, which is used here for the first time as a source for 
evaluating Spanish labour market policy, offers a complete employment history for 
each individual, with no aggregation bias. The policy analyzed consists of a one-time 
subsidy offered by some Spanish regions for new permanent contracts signed for 
certain fixed-term employees and unemployed workers. Because our policy variable 
presents individual, regional and temporal variation, we apply a triple difference 
estimator to identify the average treatment effect of this policy. We conclude that the 
outflow into permanent employment of eligible workers improves only minimally 
under this policy. Nevertheless, the incidence is relatively greater for temporary 
workers than for unemployed ones and is also larger for younger and middle-aged 
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1 Introduction 
During the last decade, fixed-term contracts have taken center stage in the economic debate over 
European labour market reform as the number of temporary contracts has steadily risen. While 
some analysts suggest that temporary contracts may act as stepping-stones towards permanent 
employment (Booth, Francesconi and Frank, 2002), there is increasing evidence that such 
contracts only serve to deepen the rift between insiders holding permanent contracts and 
outsiders who find themselves confined to the margins of the labour market, trapped between 
alternating spells of unemployment and temporary work (for the Spanish case, some recent 
studies are Güell and Petrongolo, 2007 or Rebollo, 2007). In an attempt to prevent such 
negative results, some governments have both restricted the conditions under which temporary 
employees can be hired and sought to entice employers with incentives for increasing the hiring 
under permanent contracts (OECD, 2002). The Spanish case offers a paradigmatic example 
since it is the European country with the highest rate of temporary contracts. Moreover, in order 
to reduce the presence of temporary contracts different levels of the Spanish administration have 
implemented both kinds of policies since the mid-1990s. In this paper, we aim at evaluating the 
effectiveness of regional wage subsidies –those designed as a tool to fostering permanent 
employment- by estimating their incidence over the exit rate from unemployment and from a 
temporary contract into a permanent one.  
Although economists have long advocated employment subsidies, only a few theoretical models 
yield analytical results that can help to clarify the effect of employment subsidies on labour 
market flows. Katz (1986) provides a partial equilibrium dynamic analysis of wage subsidies for 
low-wage workers. He points out that, in a situation of structural unemployment in which the 
effective labour supply is completely elastic, a proportional wage subsidy will not affect the 
worker’s wage, but rather will increase employment in proportion to the elasticity of labour 
demand for benefited workers. Yet as Calmfors (1994) has noted, the indirect effects of wage 
subsidies might weaken this result, at least in the short-run. He studied three indirect effects 
(deadweight loss, substitution effect and displacement effect) of wage subsidies. More recent 
theoretical work on the way subsidies affect job creation offers some interesting new insights. 
Mortensen and Pissarides (2001) integrate wage subsidies in a search and matching equilibrium 
framework with endogenous job destruction. For economies with strong unemployment 
compensation packages and stringent employment protection laws, they conclude that hiring 
subsidies can actually decrease permanent employment by inducing a disproportionate number 
of firms to replace old jobs with new ones, thereby leading to a higher labour market turnover. 
Their main argument is that, while hiring subsidies do indeed stimulate job creation, once a job 
has been created, the opportunity cost of the match rises, since a firm needs only create a new 
position in order to receive the same subsidy again.  
In Spain, the number of employees holding temporary contracts rose from 18% in 1987 to 33% 
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1984 labour market reform. This rise induced the government to pass different laws in 1997 and 
2001 designed to reduce the number of fixed-term contracts by lowering the firing costs of new 
permanent hires
1. Since 1997, the Spanish government has also subsidized the creation of new 
permanent contracts by applying what often amounts to a substantial discount in firm payroll 
taxes for new permanent hires; and this, in turn, has encouraged some regional governments to 
establish their own wage subsidy programs. These regional programs consist of two types of 
subsidies, paid to the firm only at the time of hiring: one for new permanent contracts signed for 
fixed-term employees at the same firm and other for unemployed workers. Thus, the promotion 
of permanent contracts has become an important labour market strategy in Spain. In fact, 
between 1999 and 2002, Spain devoted 0.28% of its GDP –more than any other OECD country- 
to subsidizing permanent employment
2. While a rigorous evaluation of the Spanish 
government’s active labour market policies would help to clarify the possible benefits brought 
on by these efforts, we have only been able to locate two studies on the subject though none of 
them are devoted to the study of the regional wage subsidies mentioned above.  
One, by Kugler, Jimeno and Hernanz (2005), analyzes the effects of the 1997 national reform on 
the country’s permanent employment rate and on the worker flows to a permanent contract. In 
this study the single group of workers not targeted by this reform, men aged between 30 and 45, 
is used as the control group and the data is extracted from the Spanish Labour Force Survey. 
Their results point to an increase of approximately 40% –four percentage points- in the quarterly 
flow of unemployed younger men into permanent positions, and of 20% -five percentage points- 
in the same flow of older men relative to that of middle-aged men during the reform years. On 
the other hand, they find that the subsidies and reduced dismissal costs have little effect on 
women. They also find an increase in post-1997 male conversions, as compared with the pre-
1997 rate, of roughly 30% for men and 15% for women
3. The other paper, by Arellano (2005), 
examines how  the unemployment rate and the employment quality of workers in Madrid 
changed as a result of Spain’s 2001 labour market reform
4. The author concluded the reform 
does not appear to have been particularly effective at inducing firms to convert temporary 
contracts into permanent ones, and that during periods of clear economic expansion firms may 
prefer to generate new permanent contracts instead. To reach these conclusions, he used a 
database provided by the National Employment Agency (INEM), basing his identification 
strategy on the various age-related eligibility conditions defined by the 2001 subsidies.  
Our paper presents the first formal evaluation of regional wage subsidies in Spain. They offer an 
additional source of identification (regional) which will help in the evaluation of such policies 
designed to enhance permanent employment. Moreover, this is also the fist study using the 
                                                 
1 The 1997 reform designed a new permanent contract for which the main differential characteristic was its lower firing costs. 
However, this reform targeted certain population groups, mainly women, the long-term unemployed and younger workers. For 
further details see Kugler, Jimeno and Hernanz (2005). 
2 Between 1996 and 2002 Spain devoted 50% of its total ALMP expenditure on subsidized employment; in this regard it was only 
outspent by Italy and Belgium, who devoted 53% and 56% of their ALMPs, respectively, to this expense. The average for European 
Countries is about 30% 
3 Nevertheless, this last result for women should be used with caution, since the authors do not account for any age-group variability 
in the eligibility requirements of the reforms in question for women. 
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Muestra Continua de Vidas Laborales (MCVL), a very large administrative dataset based on the 
complete labour history of more than one million workers, to evaluate the causal effect of this 
important labour policy. Our analysis may be said to improve on that of Kugler, Jimeno and 
Hernanz (2005) in two key ways. First, our database eliminates the possibility of aggregation 
bias since it allows us to observe all of any given worker’s labour market transitions even within 
a given month, in contrast to the quarterly transitions studied by these authors. Secondly, there 
is more variability in our policy variable since the differences between eligible and non-eligible 
workers do not rest exclusively on age but also on regional variation.
5 Additionally, for the pool 
of temporary workers, we study the conversion rate from a temporary to a permanent contract at 
the same firm, which is the specific objective of the policy we analyze.  
The multidimensional variability of the eligibility rules for these subsidies allows us to identify 
their causal effect over the inflow to permanent employment. The decision whether or not to 
issue wage subsidies is entirely up to the regional authorities, as are the timing, individual 
eligibility requirements and the amount of any subsidies to be paid. Hence, regional wage 
subsidies show greater variability than do national ones, which affect all Spanish workers in a 
given gender-age group equally. In addition, there exists a significant regional variation in 
permanent employment rates. This rate is around 60% in southern Spain but come close to 
European standards (80-85%) in areas such as Madrid and La Rioja. At the same time, regions 
of both groups have implemented important wage subsidies on new permanent contracts.  
Our exercise consists of a competing risk approach applied to two duration models in order to 
trace the impact of wage subsidies on the outflow to a permanent contract. The definition of the 
competing alternatives depends on the eligibility conditions established by the regional wage 
subsidies. First, we study the monthly conversion rate of workers who shift from temporary to 
permanent contracts within the same firm, in light of the existing alternatives (no change, 
becoming unemployed or changing firms, continuing with the same firm under a new temporary 
contract or getting into a permanent contract at the same firm). Second, we examine the monthly 
transition rate of workers who shift from unemployment to a permanent contract, when the 
alternatives are no change or temporary employment.  
Given the characteristics of the policy to be analyzed and the fact that we have longitudinal 
data, a difference-in-difference-in-difference estimator (DDD, hereafter) would appear to be our 
best tool for studying the causal effect of this policy. Hence, we identify the treatment effect 
using three variability dimensions: i) that between eligible and non-eligible workers who differ 
in their personal characteristics but belong to the same region; ii) that between eligible workers, 
relative to non-eligible ones, who have the same personal characteristics but belong to different 
regions; and iii) that between periods when wage subsidies were in effect and periods when they 
were not. Our policy variable will be based on the maximum possible wage subsidy per eligible 
individual for any given region.   
                                                 
5 This is especially relevant for the pool of temporary workers, since the limitations of their data impede them from defining a 
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The basic result of our analysis is that regional wage subsidies affect the transition to a new 
permanent contract, either from unemployment or from a temporary contract at the same firm, 
but only minimally. In fact, the incidence we observe is even smaller than that found by Kugler, 
Jimeno and Hernanz (2005). Specifically, we find that wage subsidies increase the outflow from 
temporary to permanent employment within the same firm by about 67% for middle-aged 
eligible female workers. For all other workers, the effect is non-significant. The incidence of the 
subsidies over the entrance probability to a permanent contract from unemployment is smaller 
than the one found for temporary workers, and is only statistically significant for young eligible 
ones. This probability increases by about 10% for young female workers and by about 4% for 
male ones. Nevertheless, the outflows to permanent contracts are relatively low and the overall 
change in the intra-firm outflow from temporary to permanent employment is very small. For 
instance, the estimated transition probability, in quarterly terms, for renewals moving from 
temporary into permanent contract positions increases from 0.65% to 1.09% for middle-aged 
female workers.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. First, we describe the main characteristics of wage 
subsidies designed and implemented at the regional level in Spain. Sections 3, 4 and 5 describe 
our econometric approach, our data and our main results. Finally, Section 6 discusses the main 
conclusions to be drawn from this study. 
1  Regional Wage Subsidies on New Permanent Contracts 
The promotion of permanent contracts has emerged as an important active labour market policy 
at both, the regional and national level in Spain. Since 1997, when the national government 
implemented important payroll tax discounts for new permanent employees, several Spanish 
regions established similar wage subsidies. In general, only temporary workers who are offered 
a permanent contract in the same firm and unemployed workers who are hired on a permanent 
basis can benefit from these regional subsidies. Since the decision of whether or not to 
implement such subsidies is a strictly regional one, as are the timing, individual eligibility 
conditions and the amount to be paid, regional wage subsidies show strong variability in 
comparison with those stipulated by the national policy, which affects all Spanish workers 
equally. Specifically, for the period between 1997 and 2004, this variation in the individual 
eligibility conditions and timing of wage subsidies can be traced both between and within 
regions for i) eligibility conditions and ii) subsidy amounts. Eligibility requirements are mainly 
based on certain individual worker characteristics, such as age and gender
6. For example, some 
regions offer subsidies only to women, whereas others restrict them to younger workers. In 
addition, eligibility conditions, timing and subsidy amounts can vary even within a given 
                                                 
6 The eligibility conditions of these subsidies may also depend on other individual characteristics (such as whether the worker is 
underrepresented in her occupation or is disabled) or certain aspects of the firm itself, such as its type of production activity. 
Nevertheless, since our database does not allow us to control for some of these variables, we have finally opted to consider only the 
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region. This variability allows us to examine the response of different worker groups to changes 
in the incentive being offered.
7  
The wage subsidies we are concerned, consists of a one-time payment to the firm once the new 
permanent contract is signed. Other important characteristic of this policy is that it requires that 
the hiring firm apply for the subsidy in order to receive it. Since our dataset comes from the 
Social Security archives, this condition prevents us from identifying whether or not a given 
worker with a new permanent contract actually benefited from the regional subsidies or merely 
fulfilled the corresponding eligibility criteria. In other words, given that the eligible worker in 
our sample can be identified as having fulfilled these criteria (but may or may not eventually 
have been offered permanent contracts) our analysis measures the potential impact of regional 
subsidies but cannot detect situations in which the policy fails to address certain worker groups 
for whom it was designed.
8 Nevertheless, since accepting the subsidy always implies a 
reduction in the firm’s overall labour costs, it seems reasonable to assume that firms will apply 
for such subsidies whenever the eligibility conditions are fulfilled. 
Our data on wage subsidies, which was obtained from regional government sources,  only 
includes data for subsidies issued at the regional level.
9 The main characteristics of these 
subsidies are described in Tables   1 and 2. The policy shown in Table 1 was implemented 
beginning in 1997 in some regions, after 1997 in others, and in other regions (such as Cataluña 
and Navarra) it was never implemented at all.
10 Table   1 also shows that the eligibility conditions 
for this policy vary markedly by region. In some regions, such as Andalusia, the policy applies 
to all workers, while in others it is geared towards certain worker groups such as women or 
younger adults.  
Table 2 displays the average regional subsidy paid to workers from different age and gender 
groups, calculated in 2002 Euros. One may wonder whether the effectiveness of these wage 
subsidies depends on their amount. Since the company labour costs associated with hiring a new 
permanent worker decrease as the amount of the subsidy increases, the incidence of the policy 
over the entrance rate to these contracts should also rise with the level of the subsidy. Table 2 
shows that the subsidy amount  varies considerably by region and individual eligibility 
requirements. Despite such variations, the contribution represented by this particular subsidy 
appears to be quite generous. For the year 2000, the last column of Table   1 shows the subsidy-
driven regional percentage drop in the labour costs associated with one-year contracts
11. 
                                                 
7 Another dimension of variability not taken into account here is the small differences there exist in some regions among subsidies 
for conversions and subsidies for new permanent contracts addressed at unemployed workers. 
8 Thus, our analysis might overestimate the incidence of these subsidies over the outflow to a permanent contract. One possibility to 
correct this bias is to control also for the intensity of the policy in each region by using, for example, the total number of contracts 
that have been subsidized in any given year. We are already exploring this dimension but the data on this is not yet completely 
available. 
9 It may be that some local governments also offer wage subsides or some other type of public subsidies as a means of encouraging 
firms to offer permanent contracts. 
10 While regional policies aimed to increase employment, in general, among specific worker groups did exist before 1997, we 
exclude them from this analysis on the grounds that they were not specifically designed to foster permanent employment.  
11 Recall that this wage subsidy is a one-time payment that the firm receives after the new permanent contract is signed. The total 
discount this subsidy implies over the total labour costs assumed by the firm with the new contract depends, of course, on the 
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Overall, the table indicates that regional wage subsidies imply a reduction in labour costs 
ranging from 9% in the Balearic Islands (where the subsidy was lowest) to more than 60% in 
Extremadura. In average terms, the subsidy represents about 24% of labour costs. 
This type of data has one important shortcoming: it refers to the maximum allowable wage 
subsidy for any given firm, per contract for each eligible worker characteristics. While it might 
initially seem more reasonable to use the minimum wage subsidy, in many cases the available 
information does not specify a minimum
12. Because we have chosen to use the maximum wage 
subsidy, our results will measure the maximum incidence of the subsidy. 
2  The Empirical Approach: Identification and Estimation Method  
Our goal is to measure the causal effect of regional wage subsidies on the outflow to a 
permanent contract. For this exercise, we estimate two duration models using a multiple risk 
approach. Hence, our objective is to estimate the exit or hazard rate. For each individual in our 
sample, we observe the duration of an episode of temporary work or unemployment: at time t 
the individual’s situation changes as she/he moves into a competing alternative. A common 
strategy to estimating the hazard rate is to transform the duration model into a sequence of 
discrete choice equations defined on the surviving population at each spell’s duration (see 
Jenkins, 1995). In this case, we define a binary variable ynt that takes the value of one when the 
worker changes at time t from a given state to state n, and is otherwise assumed to be zero. This 
expression has exactly the same form as the likelihood function of a multinomial discrete choice 
model where ynt is the binary endogenous dependent variable, once we have rearranged the 
database so that there are as many rows per individual as there are time units -in this case, 
months- of worker permanence in the initial situation (Allison, 1982; Jenkins, 1995). Hence, our 
likelihood function for each individual is:   
(1)  () ( )( )
11
ln *ln 1 *ln 1
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where Πnt is the conditional exit rate at time t, that is, the hazard rate to the destination state n. 
To estimate this transition probability, we will use a multinomial logit specification. Hence, the 
expression of the conditional exit rate from a certain initial state to the n-th destination state is: 
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12 In many cases, the corresponding regional government defines the maximum of the subsidy but nothing is said about the 
minimum. Thus, each regional government finally decides which the exact quantity of the subsidy is depending, as explained 
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where 
n
t P  will be defined bellow. 
2.1  The identification approach of the causal effect of the policy 
To estimate the causal effect of one policy on the economic behaviour of any given individual, 
one needs some source of policy variation. It is usual to estimate the effect of government 
policies on economic outcomes using the information provided by spatial and temporal 
variables. Our own strategy for identifying the policy incidence takes into account not two, but 
rather three dimensions of policy variability (individual, regional and temporal variability). 
Hence, our econometric approach is based in a triple difference estimator (DDD, hereafter). 
More specifically, our identification strategy not only rests on pre and post-treatment variation 
but it also rests on the comparison of similar workers –with respect to age and gender- from 
treated and untreated regions and different workers within the same region.
13 In this regard, our 
identification approach improves that of Kugler, Jimeno and Hernanz (2005) and also from that 
of Arellano (2005), since we do not rely exclusively on age-based variation in eligibility 
conditions.  
The treatment to be analysed here is the regional wage subsidy. Hence, our treatment group 
includes all workers who are potentially affected by the policy at time t and region j. They will 
be compared to all workers who are not potentially affected by the wage subsidy at time t. A 
general specification of the DDD model is expressed as follows: 
(3)  ( )
'
0
nn nn nnn n nn
ijt ijt ijt i j t it jt ij ijt Pt t x D λ αβ ημδξνψε =− ++ + + + + + + +        [3] 
where  n stands for the corresponding destination state; the function λ(t-t0) controls for the 
duration dependence of the process and t0 is the time when the spell began; the vector xijt 
contains covariates that includes time-varying personal, firm and job characteristics (age, 
country of origin, access to unemployment benefits, wage category, firm’s size, etc).  
The wage policy variable is Dijt, and takes a positive value representing the maximum wage 
subsidy when the eligible worker i, located in region j, lives in a region with wage subsidies at 
time t; otherwise, it is zero.
14 From a policy point of view, the sign, size and significance of the 
estimated parameter β, which measures the true effect of the policy once we have controlled for 
all of the covariates that can simultaneously affect treatment and outcome, is the key result here. 
We obtain our estimation of the policy incidence on the potentially treated group from the post-
treatment change in the outcome for this group, once we have controlled for the mean change in 
                                                 
13 Much of the debate over the validity of a Difference-In-Differences estimate typically revolves around the possible endogeneity of 
the interventions themselves. Besley and Case (2000) show that a potential source of bias is the presence of unobservable variables, 
which may determine both, the policy and the outcome of interest. In our case, it may be that some unobservable measure of 
pessimism about the region’s potential for economic growth influences both the existence and the generosity of the policy and the 
contract type or types in a particular region. Hence, the variability of individual eligibility conditions plays an important role in this 
study.   
14 Initially, our policy variable was a dummy variable that took the value of one when the worker i, located in region j at time t was 
eligible to receive them, and was otherwise equal to zero. However, this specification deprived us of one dimension of variability in 
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periods with and without treatment, for the mean differences among eligible and non-eligible 
workers’ outcomes and for the mean differences among regions with and without subsidies.
15 
The remaining variables in equation [3] allow for a general specification of our model and also 
for the identification of our policy’s causal effect. These controls are crucial in policy evaluation 
studies in order for β to be interpreted as the causal effect of the policy. They are fixed effects 
for individuals, regions and time and their interactions, which initially, are left unrestricted and 
are not specific to the treatment status. For instance, νjt and μj stand for the fact that regions can 
have different transitions probabilities to jobs with permanent contracts and these differences 
can be time-varying and/or permanent. One reason for the time variation of these differences 
could be region-specific business cycles while sector specialization could be the source of the 
permanent differences among regions. The terms ξit and ηi stand for the effects that are common 
across regions but differ among individuals, time-varying in the first case and fixed along time 
in the second case. Indeed, the term ξit is crucial in our study since regional wage subsidies took 
place roughly at the same time as the national reduction in payroll taxes for specific groups of 
workers (1997 and 2001).  Thus, the term ξit may be considered as a source of control for the 
effect of such national reforms. 
Obviously, a model like the one specified in [3] is difficult to estimate in full generality. 
Therefore, we must put some structure on some of these terms. In this sense, the time-varying 
aggregate effects, δt, are controlled for by a set of time varying –yearly- dummy variables. The 
regional effects, μj, will be captured by regional dummies, and individual fixed effects (ηi) will 
be approximated by age dummies.
16 Moreover, we will estimate each model separately by 
gender.
17 With respect to the interactions terms, νjt will be proxied by both a dummy variable, 
Djt, indicating whether the worker lives in a region with subsidies in year t or not and also by the 
unemployment rate in each region, ujt.
 18  
Finally, the interactions of individual effects with regions (ψij) and time (ξit) effects are more 
difficult to capture and some restrictions are needed to make the model more parsimonious. 
Given that the individual fixed effect is captured by age dummies, we represent ψij by 
interactions between age and region dummies. Finally, the time varying effects that are common 
across regions but differ among individuals (ξit) are modelled by interactions between age and 
                                                 
15 One advantage of the DDD approach is that it controls for unobserved time-invariant differences between eligible and ineligible 
workers. Therefore, the estimation of the parameter β should be the same when estimating the model with and without control for 
individual unobserved heterogeneity. In any case, we also estimate the model with individual unobserved heterogeneity, assumed to 
be independent of all regressors, as a specification test over the policy variable. We follow the approach proposed by Heckman and 
Singer (1984) when specifying the heterogeneity term, assuming that each hazard rate has two support points.  
16 We introduce also worker’s age as a continuous variable to allow for a more general effect of this variable over the hazard rates to 
be estimated. Nevertheless, the results concerning the policy effect on these flows remain almost the same when we restrict the 
effect of this variable just to age dummies. 
17 As will be discussed in the following section, the impact of these wage subsidies varies considerably across age groups, making it 
likely that the overall characteristics and behaviour of non-eligible workers will match that of the eligible ones. Hence, we will 
estimate the treatment effect allowing for different effects for different age categories. 
18 Alternatively, we could proxy νjt by interactions of regional and year dummies or by region-specific time trends. However both 
alternatives have proved to be very difficult to be identified in our sample. In any case, we have also included in our specification an 
interaction between regional dummies and two variables measuring the pre-1997 and the 1997-2001 periods in our sample. This is a 
more parsimonious way of allowing for more general regional time-varying effects, taking into account the two labour market 
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time dummies. This last group of variables may be capturing any potential asymmetric age-
related effects resulting from the 1997 national reform. 
One identification assumption is that the composition of the eligible and non-eligible worker 
groups must remain stable over time.
19 This assumption might be violated if a person eligible 
for  subsidy funding were to learn of and react to this policy before it became effective.   
Nevertheless, we feel that the strong regional and temporal variability in the eligibility 
conditions and the use of regional and individual time-varying covariates provides us with 
variables to fulfil these requirements. Admittedly, individual anticipation of the policy might 
affect the results when the period under analysis is short and when it immediately follows the 
effective start date of the new policy. In this context, one could argue that firms act strategically 
in an effort to gain as much subsidized funding as possible. But this is not the case here, since 
our study includes regions in which the policy remains unchanged over the course of several 
years.  
3  Data Description: Muestra Continua de Vidas Laborales  
The data for our analysis has been obtained from a new dataset that has recently become 
available in Spain, called the “Muestra Continua de Vidas Laborales” (MCVL, hereafter). This 
is an administrative dataset based on a random draw from the Spanish Social Security records, 
which contains a sample of 4% of all affiliated employed and unemployed workers and 
pensioners for the year 2004. Because it covers each worker’s entire labour history, it provides 
us with a sample in which individual work experiences are not left-censored for periods prior to 
that under analysis.
20 
This dataset contains information for approximately 1.1 million people and covers their entire 
labour history. Because the amount of information available for each individual is quite large, 
we have imposed some restrictions. The first of these responds to the fact that the same 
employment spell may by covered by more than one register. For example, it is quite common 
in Spain for firms to optimize their labour costs by firing workers for short periods of time and 
re-hiring them later.
21 When this occurs, we treat the employment spell as a continuous period, 
despite the short interruption that appears mid-spell. More specifically, we unify successive 
registers when they correspond to the same worker in the same firm with the same type of 
contract, and when the interruption lasts for less than 15 days.
22 Second, we disregard 
simultaneous employment spells and, instead, use the information corresponding to the longer-
lasting of these. Third, we unify any two registers that present overlapping contracts, i.e., when 
one of the contracts begins before the previous one has ended. Fourth, we eliminate any register 
                                                 
19 These assumptions are discussed in detail in Blundell and MaCurdy (1999). 
20 The previous labour history of workers is known to have a strong impact on the outflow to a permanent contract (Rebollo, 2007) 
21 A high percentage of workers in our database sign a new contract each week, mainly at the same firm.  
22 In order to avoid studying extremely short spells due to reallocation or strong turnover within the firm, we disregard employment 
spells that last less than 30 days. Since one can assume that they really are of a temporary nature, they fall outside the scope of 




























     10
that is incomplete or inaccurate, such as those in which key information is missing or is clearly 
incorrect (incompatible starting and ending dates, etc.). Fifth, we only consider the labour 
histories of workers within the so-called “Regimen General”, that is, the pool of regular paid 
employees for any given firm. Our sample excludes self-employed workers, those working 
under the “Fishing and Agriculture” rubric, and other minor special cases. Finally, given that 
there are significant lacunae in the available data on contract type for pre-1994 employment 
spells, we only study post-1994 employment (and unemployment) spells.  
This database stores the entire labour history for each worker, for whom it provides information 
relating to the worker’s age, gender, occupation and the exact duration of each 
unemployment/employment spell. The latter is especially relevant here. Since the information 
gathered by other databases is either annual or quarterly, they exclude any data relating to 
individual labour market transitions taking place over the course of an entire year or even within 
a given quarter. As a result, they tend to under-represent the real number of short-term 
temporary contracts issued for any given period. Moreover, for periods of unemployment, the 
MCVL database allows us to distinguish between those that coincide with periods of payroll tax 
payment (during which the worker receives unemployment benefits) and those that do not. The 
latter can represent either periods of unemployment without benefits or periods of inactivity. 
Nevertheless, we use the term “unemployment” to denote all periods of inactivity with respect 
to work.
23 Another interesting characteristic of this database is that it assigns a unique 
authentication code to each firm. This is fundamental to our analysis, since it helps us to 
identify situations in which the worker remains with the same firm after her contract has 
changed, or after an unemployment spell has ended. 
For our established selection criteria, we obtain 472.406 and 585.602 unemployment spells and 
299.841 and 437.262 spells of temporary contracts for female and male workers, respectively.  
The main characteristics for unemployed and temporary workers in our sample are displayed in 
Tables 3 and 4. The mean duration for temporary contracts is between 5 and 9 months. The 
same figure for unemployment spells is 5-6 months. 
In Tables   5 and   6 we show the distribution of destinations, conditional on exits, from temporary 
and unemployed workers, respectively. From Table 5 we learn that the outflow into a permanent 
contract is relatively low independently of the worker’s age, gender or region. The main 
destination state after unemployment is a temporary contract. At the same time, the data shows 
that after a temporary contract a worker is most likely to exit to unemployment or into a job at a 
different firm. Thus, the probability that a female or male worker will obtain a permanent 
contract, conditional on exiting from unemployment, is only about 13% and 11%, respectively. 
The renewal probability from a temporary to a permanent contract is much lower and 
interestingly, again, larger for women (1.2%) than it is for men (0.9%). Since regional wage 
subsidies tend to be larger for women, we might ask ourselves whether these gender-specific 
                                                 
23 We will not estimate the exit from unemployment for durations larger than 12 months. These spells will be considered in the 
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differences are the result of these regional policies. Some age-based differences can also be 
found in these tables. For instance, younger workers are more likely than workers from other 
age groups to exit from unemployment into a permanent contract; at the same time, the 
conversion probability of temporary to permanent contracts within any given firm is larger for 
older workers than it is for younger ones. The renewal probability from a temporary to a 
permanent contract is 1.5% and 1.1% for older female and male workers, respectively.  
Table   6 shows also the distribution of destinations, conditional on exits, for our sample. There 
exists also a significant regional variability with regard to outflows. Thus, the observable rates 
for Madrid, la Rioja or Catalonia are almost double those of Andalusia and Extremadura. If we 
compare this information to the data on regional subsidy amounts, it becomes evident that there 
is no clear relationship between these two variables.  
In order to get a general picture of how transition rates change over the course of any given 
spell, Figures 1 and 2 show the quarterly exit rate to a permanent contract from unemployment 
and from a temporary contract at the same firm, respectively, for male versus female workers
24. 
As expected, the exit rate from unemployment to a permanent contract decreases notably as the 
duration of the spell increases. Thus, during the first quarter this figure is close to 7%, falling 
one year later to approximately 3%. Minor gender-based differences can be observed at the 
beginning of the spell; women also face a slightly higher exit rate to a permanent contract than 
do men. By contrast, the pattern of change in the conversion rate from a temporary to a 
permanent contract tends to decrease as the duration of the temporary contract increases, with 
the exception of specific key moments, particularly the six-month, twelve-months and three-
year marks, when it tends to spike.  This rate is greater for women at the beginning of the 
contract period, while for men it is notably higher at the three-year peak.  
Figures 3 and 4 represent the unconditional transition probability from unemployment to a 
permanent contract and from a temporary to a permanent contract at the same firm, respectively 
between 1995 and 2004 among the workers in our sample. Remarkably, the outflow to a 
permanent contract increases between 1998 and 2001. Not surprisingly, this trend coincides 
with the post-1995 period of economic expansion; but, and this is particularly relevant here, it 
also coincides with the major labour market reform of 1997 and with the beginning of the 
national and regional policies to foster permanent employment. In sum, both figures highlight 
the relevance of controlling for cyclical factors as well as for periods of national reform.  
4  Results: The incidence of wage subsidies over the entrance probability to a permanent 
contract 
This section addresses the causal incidence of regional wage subsidies over the outflow to a 
permanent contract for eligible workers, both from a temporary contract and from 
                                                 
24 Though we have monthly information on spells duration we show the quarterly transition rate in order to make this information 
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unemployment. In both cases, we follow a competing risk approach because it allows for a 
better understanding of the effects of the policy variable on all the labour market transitions the 
worker may have. For instance, for the pool of temporary workers, we can evaluate whether 
wage subsidies also tend to favour the transition from one temporary contract to a renewed 
version of that contract, instead of to unemployment. It might be that the effect on the 
conversion rate to a permanent contract is low, since firms might find it profitable to exhaust 
their legal limits before using the subsidy to convert this contract into a permanent one (Güell 
and Petrongolo, 2007). This could imply that these wage subsidies are carrying deadweight 
costs since they are subsidizing new permanent contract which would be anyway signed.  
We have obtained our estimation using a sample of workers between the ages of 18 and 64, 
which we then divided up by gender in order to gain homogeneity between eligible and non-
eligible individuals. We also allowed for age-based heterogeneous treatment effects and 
modelled the policy variable as an interaction term between the policy variable and the worker’s 
age group. We studied workers from three age groups: 30 and younger, 31 to 45, and 46 and 
older. Since wage subsidies tend to vary by age, this distinction is relevant. We define the policy 
variable as the maximum permissible amount of subsidized funding per eligible individual. This 
allows us to use the individual, regional and temporal variations in this quantity for eligible 
groups, to estimate the response of eligible individuals to a change in the incentives. We 
introduce in the model the exact amount of the subsidy and its square in order to capture any 
nonlinear pattern in the treatment effect. Using this specification, we can check whether the 
wage subsidy does in fact generate a rise in permanent contracts and whether (and to what 
extent) the amount of that subsidy plays a role in that effect.
 25 
We also specify a number of personal, firm and job characteristics in order to control for certain 
differences between eligible and non-eligible individuals, which might affect our outcomes. 
These variables include worker’s age, worker’s country of origin, qualification category of the 
job,  firm size,  firm age,  full-time job, activity sector, firm’s ownership and temporary 
employment agency. These variables refer to the worker’s current job situation when employed 
and to the previous job when the worker is unemployed. As it was already mentioned in the 
previous section, we also consider variables that handle for national and region-specific time 
effects and regional fixed effects, thereby ensuring that our coefficients do not reflect smoothly 
trending omitted variables or permanent regional differences that are potentially correlated with 
the outcome under study.  Because we follow a competing risk approach for each duration 
model, we obtain a specific vector of parameters for each alternative. Moreover, each duration 
model is estimated by gender, both with and without controls for unobserved heterogeneity. We 
also estimate different specifications of each model in order to check for the robustness of the 
                                                 
25 Nevertheless, we have also estimated the model omitting the square term of the policy variable and we did not reach to different 
conclusions from the ones presented in this paper. Moreover, the statistical significance of the policy variable improves with the 
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results. For ease of exposition, we have opted to present only the most relevant of our results 
here.
26  
Before we analyze the specific results of each duration model, a few general observations are in 
order. The duration dependence of the exit probability is specified as a polynomial in the log of 
the spell duration. In addition, we build some dummy variables that control for specific contract 
durations. For instance, for temporary workers these variables are: less than 4 months and 6, 12, 
24, and 36 months. For unemployed workers these variables are: less than 4 months and 6 and 
12 months. The form of the empirical hazard rates justifies their consideration. 
It is interesting to note that all interaction terms defined in order to control for the three 
dimensions of our policy variable are jointly significant
27 and that they differ among different 
alternatives (see Table A.1 and A.2 for the pool of temporary and unemployed workers in the 
Appendix). Moreover, these results support our view that a competing risk model is the best 
way to correctly identify the effect of the wage subsidy over the outflow to a permanent 
contract, in light of each of the competing alternatives. Furthermore, the results for these 
variables suggest that there are permanent and time-varying differences between eligible and 
non-eligible worker groups and between regions that would affect the outcome under study had 
it not been included in the analysis. The remaining variables, which control for permanent and 
time-varying differential effects by age group, are also statistically significant, in general. For 
instance, our results confirm the appropriateness of considering age-based differences in the 
effects of the business cycle and in the effects of the national labour market policies over the 
outflow to a permanent contract, as well as age-based differences.  
For ease of exposition, we will summary the main results for each of our duration models. Each 
summary includes the odd ratio, the total change in the exit probability for each alternative, both 
of which are measured at the average wage subsidy of 4.800 Euros and the Wald test of the joint 
statistical significance of the level and quadratic effect of the policy variable
28. The odd ratio 
offers an easy way to summarize the main effects of the subsidies over the ratio of the outflow 
to a permanent contract relative to each competing alternative, comparing for each case the 
outflow for eligible versus non-eligible workers
29. For instance, this ratio allows to test whether 
wage subsidies benefit more the accumulation of temporary contracts than the conversion of this 
temporary contract into a permanent one. By contrast, the total change in the exit probability 
shows whether wage subsidies have a substantial causal impact for eligible workers on the 
transition probability to each of the competing alternatives in relation to remaining at the same 
position.  
                                                 
26 In the Appendix, we present the complete set of results of the estimations carried out. 
27 We have tested the joint significance (Wald test) of the different groups of interactions for each competing alternative and they are 
all highly significant. 
28 Standard errors are corrected to take into account the group structure of our policy variable.  
29 Thus, the odd ratio could be expressed as follows: [(Pi(e)/ Pi(ne))/ (Pj(e)/ Pj(ne))]-1  where “P(.)” is the probability of a certain 
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4.1  The Effects of Regional Wage Subsidies on the Conversion Rate from a Temporary to a 
Permanent Contract at the Same Firm 
For temporary workers, the only existing wage subsidies are those that support the conversion 
of a temporary contract into a permanent one within the same firm. This restriction affects our 
analysis in two ways. First, if affects the way we define the competing alternatives. These are: i) 
remaining at the same temporary contract
30; ii) accepting another temporary contract with the 
same employer; iii) accepting a permanent contract with the same employer; iv) becoming 
unemployed or accepting a contract with a different employer. We matched the unemployment 
alternative with that of a direct transition to a different firm, since it seems reasonable to assume 
that workers who change firms will be unemployed for at least one day. For ease of exposition, 
this latter alternative will henceforth be denoted as “exit to unemployment”. Second, workers 
directly hired by a Temporary Employment Agency will not benefit from any subsidies unless 
they become unemployed. In order to sharpen our definition of a potentially eligible worker, we 
have therefore excluded all temporary workers who were hired through such agencies from the 
estimation of this model. However, these workers will figure among the sample of unemployed 
workers we will analyze bellow.  
Table 7 gives a summary of our main results. We can evaluate the impact of the subsidies by 
looking at the total change in the transition probability for eligible workers versus non-eligible 
ones brought about as a direct result of these funds. The results presented in Table 7 show that 
the impact of wage subsidies over the employee outflow to a permanent contract at the same 
firm varies considerably by worker type. It is positive for young and middle-aged female 
workers and for old male ones, but it is only statistically significant for middle-aged women. In 
this last case, this probability increases by 66.91% for eligible workers relative to non-eligible 
ones.
31 For the rest of workers the effect of wage subsidies over this outflow is negative but it is 
not statistically significant, as well.  
Looking at the odd ratios we can observe that the probability of obtaining a permanent contract 
at the same firm, for eligible workers versus non-eligible ones, relative to the same ratio among 
eligible and non-eligible for the exiting to unemployment is positive in cases involving young 
and middle-aged female workers and old male ones but the effect of the policy is statistically 
significant only in the case of middle-aged women. For them, the odd ratio is 66.05%. That is, 
the increase in the probability of exiting to a permanent contract for eligible workers is 66.91% 
while the growth in the probability of exiting to unemployment for eligible workers relative to 
non-eligible ones is only 0.52%. We obtain also that the odd ratio of obtaining a permanent 
contract instead of exiting to another temporary contract at the same firm is also positive for 
female workers and for old male ones but the effects are only statistically significant for young 
                                                 
30 Temporary contracts are censored at duration 36. 
31 It is also interesting to note that, for middle age female workers, the change in the intra-firm transition probability to a permanent 
contract increases as the wage subsidy rises to the observed maximum value (12.200 Euros). For instance, the odd ratio of exiting to 
a permanent contract is 101% when the wage subsidy is 6.800 Euros and 210% when the wage subsidy is 12.200 Euros. Therefore, 
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and middle-aged female ones. These odd ratios are 15.08% and 82.47%, respectively. In both 
cases, these odd ratios are larger than the ones relative to the alternative of unemployment 
because the probability of renewal with a temporary contract at the same firm drops for eligible 
workers (-3.74% for young female workers and -8.53% for middle-aged female ones). 
Interestingly, this result shows that regional wage subsidies do not seem to favour the 
accumulation of temporary contracts at the same firm for these eligible workers.  
Table 8 shows the estimated intra-firm transition rate to a permanent contract, in quarterly 
terms, with and without the wage subsidy. This quarterly transition rate is computed at the mean 
of the explanatory variables and is measured during the second quarter of the temporary 
contract. This table shows that since the transition rates to a permanent contract at the same firm 
are fairly low, the increase in the employee outflow to a permanent contract at the same firm 
generated by these changes is quite small. For instance, the quarterly estimated transition 
probability rises from 0.65% to 1.09% for middle-aged women, at the second quarter of the 
temporary contract.  
Since this low sensibility of the flow to a new permanent contract could be related with the 
temporary nature of the job we have also estimated the model restricting the sample to workers 
with temporary contracts of duration longer than three months. Though, there are not relevant 
differences, we find interesting to point out that the effects of wage subsidies over the outflow 
to a permanent contract at the same firm are slightly smaller. Specifically, the total change in the 
exit probability to a permanent contract caused by regional wage subsidies is around 46% for 
middle-aged women. Interestingly, for the case of young workers the incidence of regional 
wage subsidies slightly varies from the previous estimation. In the case of young female 
workers we obtain that regional wage subsidies increase the exit probability to unemployment 
and decrease the probability of renewal the temporary contract, for eligible workers. We obtain 
that the first probability increases by 6% while the second one decreases by 12%, for young 
female eligible workers. For young male workers we obtain that the probability of renewal the 
temporary contract increases for the eligible ones by around 9%. The incidence of regional 
wage subsidies for the rest of workers is not statistically significant. Overall, thus, we cannot 
conclude that the low sensibility of the flow to a new permanent contract to regional wage 
subsidies is due to the temporary nature of the jobs covered by these contracts.  
Finally, we have also estimated the model for workers hired only by private firms. Previous 
empirical research has shown that the increasing trend in the rate of temporary contracts is due 
to the increasing use of these contracts from the public sector, mainly local agents (Dolado, 
García-Serrano, and Jimeno, 2002). Again the results obtained for the policy variables are pretty 
similar and, hence, we do not find evidence of relevant differences between eligible workers in 
private or public firms. For instance, the total change in the exit probability to a permanent 
contract caused by regional wage subsidies is around 45% for middle-aged women and as 
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4.2  Effects of the Regional Wage Subsidies over the Transition Rate from Unemployment to 
a Permanent Contract 
In the case of exiting from unemployment, some of the explanatory variables used for the 
estimation differ slightly from those explained before. Specifically, we add two variables that 
identify whether the worker (1) is eligible for unemployment benefits and (2) receives them in 
each month analyzed. We also consider here whether she was previously hired by a Temporary 
Employment Agency and whether she returns to a firm for which she has previously worked or 
begins with a new one.  
In Table 9, we display the predicted treatment effects by age and gender. The first result 
emerging from this table is that the impact of wage subsidies over the transition to a permanent 
contract is lower for unemployed workers than it is for temporary ones. In addition, we find that 
the largest incidence of wage subsidies over the outflow to a permanent contract occurs for 
younger workers: the odd ratios of exiting to a permanent contract relative to a temporary one 
are positive for younger eligible workers, both males and females, while for the rest of cases the 
odd ratios are quantitatively irrelevant or the coefficients are not statistically significant. This 
odd ratio for young workers is 14.69% for females and 5.01% for males. In fact, for these two 
worker groups the exit to a temporary contract for eligible workers decreases, by about 4.46% 
for women and 1.43% for men, while the exit to a permanent contract increases by 10.00% for 
women and 3.51% for men. Hence, as it is shown in Table 10, regional wage subsidies are 
causing the exit from unemployment to a permanent contract to increase from 7.90% to 8.64% 
for young female workers and from 7.32% to 7.57% for the young male ones. 
In sum, the impact of regional wage subsidies on the outflow to a permanent contract from 
unemployment is low. While younger workers benefit the most from such funds, the policy has 
no effect for male workers over the age of 30 and just marginally favours the exit from 
unemployment to a temporary contract for older women. 
To check the robustness of our results, we perform two additional estimations, one restricted to 
workers who had previously held temporary contracts and other restricted to workers who had 
previously held permanent contracts. In the first case, the results hardly vary from the ones 
presented. For instance, for eligible young female women, the probability of entering into a 
permanent contract increases by 9.79% due to regional wage subsidies. On the contrary, when 
we focus on the second case, some differences emerge that are worth to mention. Now the 
incidence of regional wage subsidies are stronger for young male workers since the probability 
of entering into a permanent contract for eligible workers increases by 29.32%. Meanwhile, the 
probability of existing from unemployment into temporary contract decreases by 25.62% and 
the outflow to a permanent contract increases by 6.77% for eligible young women.
32  
                                                 
32 These results could be interpreted as evidence of some churning effect, in the sense of some permanent workers being fired and 
re-hired after being unemployed in order to get the subsidy again. This might be tested by studying in more detail the transitions of 
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5  Conclusions 
Spain has one of the highest rates of temporary contracts in all of Europe, a situation that may 
redound negatively on the national economy by decreasing its efficiency and undermining 
equity conditions. As a preventative measure, the national and some regional governments have 
designed different policies geared towards the creation of permanent jobs. These measures 
include the national initiative to cut payroll taxes on new permanent contracts and the many 
regional wage subsidies for new permanent hires that have sprung up around the country since 
1997, and which target a number of different worker groups. 
In this paper, we have estimated the incidence of regional wage subsidies over the transition 
from a temporary to a permanent job at the same firm and from unemployment to a permanent 
job. In both cases, we have used a competing risk model and we followed a Difference-in-
Difference-in-Difference (DDD) approach. Our analysis makes use of the regional and temporal 
variability in regional wage subsidies (similarly to what is usually done in the US), and the 
differences in individual eligibility criteria, as tools that can help identify the treatment effect. In 
order to gain homogeneity between both groups in our sample, we also divide it into gender 
groups and measure the effect of the policy on workers from different age groups. 
Our main results suggest that subsidizing new permanent contracts has a positive but small 
effect on the flow to a permanent job, and only for certain eligible worker groups. At any rate, a 
number of differences in our results associated with the initial job status, gender and age are 
worth mentioning here. Middle-aged female workers, for example, appear to derive the greatest 
benefit from wage subsidy schemes, followed by young ones. Nevertheless, the quantitative 
effects of these wage subsidies over the entrance probability to a permanent contract are fairly 
low. The intra-firm conversion rate for eligible workers moving from a temporary to a 
permanent contract increases by about 67% for middle-aged female workers (from 0.65% to 
1.09% in the second quarter of the temporary contract). The probability of exiting from 
unemployment to permanent employment increases only by 10% for younger female workers 
and by about 4% for younger male ones.   
Wage subsidies to new permanent contracts work basically in two ways. First, they provide 
firms that offer permanent contracts to eligible individuals with funding incentives that may 
enhance the worker’s probability of accessing to that position. Second, they decrease the 
likelihood that certain non-eligible individuals will obtain such a position. Therefore, one could 
claim that substitution effects between eligible and non-eligible workers might explain the low 
change in the permanent employment rate observed during the period analyzed. Nevertheless, 
given the results presented, substitution effects between eligible and non-eligible temporary or 
unemployed workers seem not to be the reason since we do not find strong effects on the inflow 
to a permanent contract for eligible workers and on the outflow to unemployment or to a 
temporary contract for the non-eligible ones. Our results seem to match the predictions of recent 
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to temporarily reduce hiring costs and they do not help close the significant existing gap 
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List of Tables:  
1. TABLE   1: Regional Wage Incentives to the Creation of Permanent Contracts: Eligibility 
Conditions by Age and Gender across Spanish Regions (1997-2004) 
 MALES  FEMALES 
Andalusia   all  ages  1997-2002   all  ages  1997-2002 
Aragon   40 or more  1998-2004   all ages  1998-2004 
Asturias   all ages  1997-1998, 2000-2003   all ages  1997-1998, 2000-2003 
Balearic Islands   NO     all ages  2000-2004 
Canary Islands   18-25  1.998   all ages  1.998 
   all ages  1.999   all ages  1.999 
Cantabria   all ages  1998, 2000-2004   all ages  1998, 2000-2004 
C. Leon   all ages  1998-2004   all ages  1998-2004 
C. Mancha   16-30  1.998   all ages  1.998 
   16-29 & 45 or more  1999-2003   all ages  1999-2003 
Catalunya   NO     NO   
Valencia   all  ages 
1998-2001, 
2003-2004   all ages  1998-2004 
Extremadura   all  ages 1997-2004    all  ages  1997-2004 
Galicia   18-30 & 45 or more  1998   all ages  1.998 
   all ages  1999-2004   all ages  1999-2004 
Madrid   all ages  1998-2004   all ages  1998-2004 
Murcia   all ages  1998-2004   all ages  1998-2004 
Navarra NO   NO   
Basque Country   all ages 1998-2004    all  ages  1998-2004 
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2. TABLE 2: Regional Incentives to the Creation of Permanent Contracts 
Gender Age 





Andalusia 3,504  4,153 4,437 2,803  4,317  3,713  20.3% 
Aragon 3,543  4,944 4,317  4,089 4,828  4,326  22.1% 
Asturias 3,954  4,280 4,055 4,060  4,288  4,086  20.3% 
Balearic Islands   0  2,912 2,907 2,906  2,956  2,912  16.3% 
Canary Islands   3,256  3,600 3,498 3,331  2,991  3,422  19.7% 
Cantabria 3,117  4,366 3,832 2,991  4,303  3,636  19.3% 
C. Leon  3,573  4,114 4,593  3,225 2,413  3,788  22.1% 
C. Mancha  3,097  3,812 3,392 3,817  3,413  3,473  18.4% 
Catalunya 0  0 0  0  0  0  0.0% 
Valencia 3,414  3,166 3,419 3,032  3,459  3,307  18.2% 
Extremadura 9,149  8,668 8,389 9,061  10,543  8,974  55.5% 
Galicia 2,962  4,411 3,886  3,327 3,211  3,639  20.9% 
Madrid 8,094  8,374 8,154  8,245 8,462  8,218  33.3% 
Murcia 4,591  5,224 4,981  4,538 5,258  4,826  29.3% 
Navarra 0  0   0    0  0  0.0% 
Basque Country  6,299  6,977 6,591 6,560  6,503  6,571  28.3% 
Rioja 5,564  5,604 5,556  5,603 5,648  5,583  30.5% 
Total  4,621 5,036 5,010  4,498  4,564  4,797 23.8% 
 
Note: To compute the last column we have taken the total labour costs per year for each region from the survey of 
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3. TABLE 3: Main Sample Characteristics for Workers with a Temporary Contract by Gender  
 Women  Men 
 Censored 













T.C Duration  11.4  5.9  5.2  7.5  11.7  6.2 6.3 8.7 
Age  33  30  32  31  34 31 33 32 
High Qualification  18.7%  8.2%  10.3%  6.0%  8.9% 2.9% 2.9% 3.6% 
Medium-High 
Qualification  14.5% 13.9% 12.6%  15.0%  8.9% 7.0% 4.6% 9.1% 
Medium-Low 
Qualification  28.4% 31.1% 25.8%  37.3%  40.7% 34.2% 40.3% 36.6% 
Low  Qualification  37.4% 46.6% 51.7%  41.3%  41.8% 55.7% 52.1% 50.1% 
Immigrant  5.2% 3.0% 1.6%  3.4%  9.0% 6.4% 4.4% 4.5% 
Part-time  35.6% 37.5% 28.2%  35.0%  11.0% 15.1% 13.1% 14.7% 
Industry 8.9%  9.4%  11.7%  19.4%  12.9% 12.2% 12.0% 32.3% 
Construction  3.6% 1.7% 0.7%  1.6%  40.1% 34.5% 35.5% 18.3% 
Services  87.0% 88.0% 87.4%  78.6%  46.0% 51.3% 51.5% 48.6% 
Private  Firm  74.9% 88.9% 80.6%  95.9%  90.5% 92.0% 94.3% 98.3% 
Sample Size  57,570  221,985  17,352 2,934 80,363 324,253 29,449  3,197 
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4. TABLE 4: Main Sample Characteristics for Unemployed Workers by Gender  
 Women  Men 
  Censored  T.C P.C  Censored T.C P.C 
U.  Duration  13.4  5.3 5.8  11.9  4.8 5.4 
Age  31  29 29 32 30 29 
Temporary Employment Agency  6.1%  8.3% 7.6% 6.4%  10.0%  8.4% 
Equal Employer  -  37.7%  23.9  -  26.9%  17.5% 
High Qualification  6.3%  7.5% 6.1% 4.9% 2.8% 5.4% 
Medium-High Qualification  13.1%  14.1% 14.9%  9.5%  7.0%  11.7% 
Medium-Low Qualification  31.3%  33.4% 37.0% 34.1% 32.7% 31.4% 
Low Qualification  49.1%  44.7% 41.9% 52.1% 57.3% 51.0% 
Immigrant  3.5%  2.5% 3.2% 5.4% 5.7% 5.2% 
Part-time  40.4%  37.2% 48.7% 18.9% 15.8% 19.5% 
Industry  9.8%  9.8%  10.0% 12.1% 12.7% 17.6% 
Construction  2.9%  1.7%  1.7%  29.6% 34.6% 17.7% 
Services  86.4%  88.7% 87.5% 56.8% 52.6% 64.6% 
Unemployment Benefits (t=1)  35.4%  27.0% 32.8% 36.5% 31.7% 33.9% 
Unemployment Benefits (t=T)  20.0%  18.1% 22.1% 24.0% 23.9% 24.5% 
Sample size  61,961  350,018 60,697  63,826 458,307 63,472 
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5. TABLE 5:  Distribution of destinations, conditional on exit, for Unemployed and 
Temporary Workers by Age and Gender 
Unemployed 
    U. - P.C.    U. - T.C. 
   Women Men Women  Men 
 <30  14.14%  12.39%  85.86%  87.61% 
 30-45  12.00%  9.66%  88.00%  90.34% 
 >45  12.24%  9.30%  87.76%  90.70% 
Average 13.43%  11.33%  86.57%  88.67% 
Temporary Contract 
    T.C -P.C. Same Firm  T.C -T.C. Same Firm 
   Women Men Women  Men 
 <30  1.13%  0.85%  6.21%  7.06% 
 30-45  1.22%  0.82%  8.97%  10.13% 
 >45  1.53%  1.14%  9.36%  10.51% 
Average 1.19%  0.88%  7.32%  8.45% 
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6. TABLE 6: Distribution of destinations, conditional on exit, for Unemployed and Temporary 
Workers by Region and Gender 
  Unemployed Temporary  Contract 




   Women Men  Women  Men Women  Men 
Andalucia 9.87%  6.90%  8.68%  12.00%  1.20%  0.65% 
Aragon 12.75%  12.75%  8.33%  7.83%  1.21%  1.07% 
Asturias 11.18%  9.43%  7.49%  8.57%  1.17%  0.76% 
Baleares 15.45%  11.89%  2.67%  5.18%  0.73%  0.62% 
Canarias 14.17%  11.16%  5.35% 5.39% 1.13%  0.86% 
Cantabria 10.91%  9.85%  8.34%  9.19%  1.31%  1.16% 
Castilla-Mancha 10.72%  9.16% 8.52%  11.51%  1.07%  0.83% 
Castilla-León 12.02%  11.06%  7.47%  8.01%  1.06%  0.76% 
Cataluña 16.60%  15.13%  5.63%  5.78%  1.29%  1.07% 
C. Valenciana  12.92%  11.92% 7.44%  7.71% 1.31% 1.12% 
Extremadura 9.61%  8.13%  6.32%  10.41%  0.95%  0.67% 
Galicia  10.51%  10.76% 11.72% 10.51% 1.38% 0.81% 
Madrid 17.18%  15.63%  5.67%  7.41%  1.05%  0.78% 
Murcia 12.12%  11.23%  6.82%  6.7  1.26%  1.19% 
Navarra 13.63%  12.50%  9.62% 9.93% 1.58%  1.27% 
País Vasco  11.11%  11.30%  11.22% 11.08% 1.30% 1.24% 
Rioja 13.15%  13.26%  10.19%  9.95%  1.60%  1.81% 
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3.  FIGURE   3:Unconditional Entrance Probability to a Permanent Contract from a Temporary Contract at 





































     29






































     30
 
TABLE 7: Main Results of the Effects of the Wage Subsidy by Gender and Age (Exit 
from a Temporary Contract) 
 
       To U 
To T. C. 
same firm 




Odd Ratio  10.32%  15.08%  -  10.94% 










Odd Ratio  66.05%  82.47%  -  67.24% 










Odd Ratio  -26.32%  -13.50%  -  -25.92% 
Total Change in Probability
Women 
 >45 









Odd Ratio  -26.12%  -33.64%  -  -27.13% 










Odd Ratio  -15.75%  -18.36%  -  -13.26% 
Total Change in Probability  30-45 









Odd Ratio  34.89%  30.65%  -  43.37% 













Notes:  U= Unemployment or Different Firm; TC= Temporary Contract, Same Firm; PC = Permanent Contract and Same Firm. 
The Odd Ratio measures the change in the ratio of the probability of exiting to a permanent contract for eligible workers 
versus non-eligible ones, relative to the same ratio –eligible versus non-eligible-, for the available alternatives, when the 
wage subsidy takes the average sample value (4,800 Euros). 
The total change in probability is measured at the average wage subsidy and at t=6. 
The significance test shown is the result of the Wald Test of the joint statistical significance of the level and quadratic 





























     31
7. TABLE 8:Estimated Conversion Rate from a Temporary to a Permanent contract at the 
Same Firm (Quarterly Transition Rates)  
 
  Estimated Transition Rate to PC (2º Quarter)*   
  
   Without the RWS  With the RWS  Growth Rate  
Women   <30 0.83%  0.92% 10.84% 
   30-45 0.65%  1.09%  66.97% 
   >45 1.49%  1.11%  -25.58% 
Men   <30 0.56%  0.41%  -27.00% 
   30-45 0.48%  0.42%  -12.26% 
   >45 0.57%  0.80% 41.57% 
 
Note: We display all the estimated transition rates but to correctly interpret these results, one must to take  
          into account the statistical significance of these estimations showed in Table 7. 
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8. TABLE 9: Main Results by Gender and Age of the Policy Variable (Exit from 
Unemployment) 
 
      To T. C.   To P.C.  
Stayed 
Unemployed 
Odd Ratio  14.69%  -  9.05% 





(10.09)**  0.48% 
Odd Ratio  7.98%  -  6.51% 





(1.24)  0.05% 
Odd Ratio  -8.72%  -  -8.14% 







(1.71)  0.15% 
Odd Ratio  5.01%  -  3.29% 








Odd Ratio  -1.01%  -  4.05% 








Odd Ratio  1.04%  -  -5.31% 











Notes:   TC= Temporary Contract; PC = Permanent Contract 
The Odd Ratio measures the change in the ratio of the probability of exiting to a permanent contract for 
eligible workers versus non-eligible ones, relative to the same ratio –eligible versus non eligible-, for the 
available alternatives, when the wage subsidy takes the average sample value (4,800 Euros). 
The total change in probability is measured at the average wage subsidy and at t=3. 
The significance test shown is the result of the Wald Test of the joint statistical significance of the level and 





























     33
9. TABLE 10:Expected Growth Rate of the Entrance Probability to a Permanent contract 
from Unemployment as a Result of the Policy (Quarterly Transition Rates) 
 
  Estimated Transition Rate to 
PC (1er Quarter)   
  
   With RWS  Without RWS  % Change 
Women   <30  8.64%  7.90%  9.40% 
   30-45  8.07%  7.59%  6.39% 
   >45  7.44%  8.07%  -7.82% 
Men   <30  7.57%  7.32%  3.44% 
   30-45  7.88%  7.67%  2.73% 
   >45  8.06%  8.38%  -3.73% 
 
Note: We display all the estimated transition rates but to correctly interpret these results, 


































TABLE A.1 Main Results for the Exit Rate from a Temporary Contract (Part I) 
 Men  Women 
  Unemployment  T.C Same Firm  P. C. Same Firm Unemployment T.C Same Firm  P. C. Same Firm
 Coef.  t-S  Coef.  t-S  Coef.  t-S  Coef.  t-S  Coef.  t-S  Coef.  t-S 
Dijt*Age1  -0.005 -0.68  0.024  1.39 -0.086 -0.90 0.006 0.58 0.013 0.41  0.029  0.39 
Dijt*Age1^2  0.000 0.70 -0.001  -0.77  0.004 0.59  -0.001 -1.21 -0.004 -1.55  -0.002  -0.29 
Dijt*Age2  0.010 1.26  0.012 0.54  -0.025  -0.27 0.008 0.87 -0.011  -0.37  0.116  1.20 
Dijt*Age2^2  -0.001 -1.45  0.000  0.02 -0.001 -0.14 -0.001 -1.94 -0.001 -0.66  -0.002  -0.27 
Dijt*Age3  0.018 1.56  0.024 0.86 0.107 0.90  0.003 0.27 -0.039  -0.73 -0.120 -1.03 
Dijt*Age3^2  -0.001 -1.33  -0.001 -0.51 -0.007 -0.77 -0.001 -0.58 0.002 0.39  0.012  1.32 
Djt  -0.006 -0.29  -0.073 -1.43 0.138  0.59  -0.057 -1.75 -0.081 -0.83  0.082  0.33 
Age  -0.024 -7.76  0.052  5.66  0.095  3.16  -0.046 -9.42 0.061 3.43  0.141  3.71 
Age^2  0.000 4.71 -0.001  -5.04  -0.001  -3.25 0.000 7.27 -0.001  -2.91 -0.002 -3.90 
y1996  -0.274 -1.85  0.145 0.34 0.005 0.00  -0.443 -2.40 0.739 1.39  1.219  0.90 
y1997  0.175 1.50  1.214 1.41 0.831 0.53  -0.191 -1.89 0.722 1.52 -0.100 -0.07 
y1998  -0.063 -0.60  1.143 1.32 0.914 0.58  -0.057 -0.60 0.528 1.19 -0.353 -0.32 
y1999  -0.112 -1.16  1.279 1.48 1.130 0.70  0.149 1.71 0.753 1.87  1.294  1.31 
y2000  -0.029 -0.68  1.250 1.44 1.433 0.89  0.107 1.28 0.211 1.13 -0.634 -1.41 
y2001  -0.136 -1.46  1.387 1.61 1.571 0.96  0.009 0.24 0.593 1.51  0.811  0.87 
y2002  -0.040 -1.34  1.415 1.65 1.600 0.98  -0.082 -2.57 -0.048 -0.40  0.589  1.41 
y2003  -0.069 -2.08  1.494 1.74 1.514 0.94  -0.081 -2.49 -0.186 -1.51  0.896  2.21 
y2004  -0.045 -1.17  1.424 1.66 1.847 1.14  -0.081 -2.5 -0.207  -1.30 0.797  2.23 
Age1  0.106 0.96  0.581 1.40  -1.065  -1.40 0.192 1.69 0.280 0.58  1.959  1.47 
Age2  -0.015 -0.14  0.610  1.53 -1.337 -1.71 -0.079 -0.83 -0.062 -0.19  -0.225  -0.17 
y1995*Age1 -0.071  -0.71  -0.327  -0.71  0.960 0.90  0.084 0.50  0.426 1.08  1.200  1.25 
y1996*Age1 -0.164  -3.23  0.116  0.88  1.042  1.79 0.031 0.59 -0.220 -0.61 -0.637 -0.96 
y1997*Age1 -0.075  -1.64  -0.195  -2.02  0.883 1.94  -0.030 -0.64 0.078  0.26 0.704 1.04 
y1998*Age1 0.007  0.23  -0.036  -0.31  1.273  4.12 -0.124 -3.02 0.094  0.53  1.081  1.73 
y1999*Age1 0.000  -0.01  -0.023  -0.20  1.335  3.57 -0.070 -1.48 -0.098 -0.61  -0.449  -0.98 
y2000*Age1 0.047  1.39  0.141  1.19  1.004  3.02  -0.031 -0.63 -0.047 -0.27  -0.015  -0.04 
y2001*Age1 0.046  1.32  -0.148  -1.27  1.052  2.88 -0.076 -1.83 0.060  0.41  -0.227  -0.48 
y2002*Age1 0.052  1.39  -0.046  -0.48  0.914  2.73 0.002 0.05  0.237 1.62  -0.559 -1.22 
y2003*Age1 0.021  0.50  -0.059  -0.62  0.691  2.12 -0.025 -0.68 0.236  1.32  -0.604  -1.53 
y1995*Age2 0.040  0.35  0.061  0.13  1.033  0.92 0.063 0.37  0.169 1.04  -0.245 -0.56 
y1996*Age2 -0.028  -0.54  0.286  1.97  1.510  2.44 0.156 2.56 -0.116 -0.30 -0.142 -0.22 
y1997*Age2 -0.040  -0.85  -0.002  -0.03  0.845 1.81  0.080 1.53  0.197 0.69  0.262  0.37 
y1998*Age2 -0.022  -0.62  0.069  0.56  0.920  3.00 -0.009 -0.20 0.388  2.22  1.170  1.86 
y1999*Age2 -0.029  -0.67  0.056  0.48  0.965  2.67 -0.024 -0.47 0.060  0.39  -0.691  -1.44 
y2000*Age2 0.007  0.19  0.280  2.57  0.584  1.80  -0.035 -0.67 0.043 0.25 -0.547 -1.29 
y2001*Age2 0.033  0.95  0.080  0.71  1.012  2.84  -0.027 -0.58 0.055 0.38 -0.728 -1.47 
y2002*Age2 0.061  1.64  0.044  0.44  0.447  1.28 0.050 1.16  0.248 1.69  -0.516 -1.11 
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TABLE A.1 Main Results for the Exit Rate from a Temporary Contract (Part II) 
 Men  Women 
  Unemployment  T.C Same Firm  P. C. Same Firm Unemployment T.C Same Firm  P. C. Same 
Firm 
 Coef.  t-S  Coef.  t-S  Coef.  t-S  Coef. t-S  Coef.  t-S  Coef.  t-S 
Andalucía  0.188 1.72  -0.129 -0.32  -2.798  -3.65 0.227 1.9 0.906  2.49  1.933  1.57
Aragón  -0.123 -1.36  -0.119 -0.29  -1.370  -2.43 -0.068 -0.51 0.487 1.27 2.252  1.64
Asturias  -0.199 -1.75  -0.130 -0.34  -2.272  -2.78 0.052 0.42 0.312  0.70  2.950  2.16
Baleares  0.161 1.62  -0.052 -0.14  -2.290  -2.72 0.258 2.33 0.096  0.18  1.999  1.57
Canarias  0.104 1.01  -0.890 -2.15  -2.033  -3.01 0.202 1.84 -0.045  -0.13  2.216  1.79
Cantabria  -0.079 -0.71  -0.052 -0.11  -2.344  -3.15 0.201 1.52 1.050  2.57  2.074  1.48
Castilla-León  0.218 2.23  0.149 0.40  -1.352  -2.32 0.439 3.59 0.551  1.19  2.387  1.91
Castilla-La Mancha  -0.003 -0.04  -0.337 -0.90  -2.489  -3.61 0.156 1.36 1.082  3.02  1.800  1.42
Cataluña  0.089 0.94  -0.515 -1.39  -0.972  -1.50 0.092 0.89 0.057  0.15  2.176  1.79
Comunidad Valenciana  0.190 2.14  -0.231 -0.64  -1.159  -2.24 0.353 3.3 0.586  1.66  2.423  2.01
Extremadura  -0.014 -0.11  -0.424 -1.05  -2.704  -2.80 -  -  -  -  -  - 
Galicia  -0.120 -1.25  -0.848 -1.99  -2.639  -3.70 0.192 1.67 1.091  3.02  1.555  1.22
Madrid  -0.201 -2.36  -0.345 -0.94  -1.827  -3.82 -0.012 -0.12 0.360 1.06 1.656  1.49
Murcia  0.148 1.55  0.119 0.31  -1.210  -1.99 0.373 2.86 1.270  3.09  2.594  2.04
Navarra  -0.041 -0.30  0.098 0.22  0.348  0.43  -0.004 -0.04 0.758 2.21 1.670  1.21
País Vasco  -0.190 -1.78  0.058 0.15  -1.947  -3.29 0.049 0.43 1.152  3.20  1.969  1.63
Andalucía*Age1 -0.318  -3.07  -0.535  -1.33 0.625 0.93  -0.319 -2.87  -0.240  -0.54  -2.211  -1.69
Aragón*Age1 -0.029  -0.26  -0.417  -0.91 0.380  0.54 -0.051 -0.37  -0.138 -0.29 -2.610  -1.84
Asturias*Age1 -0.060  -0.44  -0.696  -1.62 0.598  0.69 -0.202 -1.57  -0.115 -0.22 -3.823  -2.64
Baleares*Age1 -0.152  -1.31  -0.537  -1.27 0.418  0.44 -0.172 -1.47  -0.586 -0.99 -2.800  -2.07
Canarias*Age1 -0.142  -1.27  -0.127  -0.29 0.790 1.05  -0.254 -2.21  0.074  0.16  -2.403  -1.80
Cantabria*Age1 -0.142  -1.13  -0.714  -1.39 -0.343  -0.37 -0.084 -0.57  -0.447 -0.88  -2.799 -1.89
Castilla-León*Age1 -0.356  -3.19  -0.389  -0.94 -0.178 -0.25  -0.522 -4.13 0.092 0.17 -2.605  -1.93
Castilla-La Mancha*Age1  -0.163  -1.55  -0.508  -1.20 0.469 0.55  -0.245 -2.04  -0.931  -2.02  -2.448  -1.79
Cataluña*Age1 -0.181  -1.65  -0.387  -0.93 -0.137  -0.18 -0.119 -1.09  -0.261 -0.57  -2.716 -2.07
Com. Valenciana*Age1  -0.240  -2.31  -0.455  -1.13 -0.014 -0.02  -0.326 -2.88 -0.246  -0.54  -2.578  -1.98
Extremadura*Age1 -0.274  -2.19  -0.540  -1.25 0.365 0.40  -0.271 -2.79  0.665  1.64  -0.706  -0.69
Galicia*Age1 -0.206  -1.89  -0.248  -0.54 0.753  0.99 -0.384 -3.26  -0.383 -0.84 -2.278  -1.67
Madrid*Age1 -0.056  -0.54  -0.512  -1.24 0.238  0.38 -0.094 -0.86  -0.105 -0.24 -2.628  -2.14
Murcia*Age1 -0.241  -2.16  -0.341  -0.80 0.079  0.12 -0.411 -3.01  -1.139 -2.26 -3.656  -2.70
Navarra*Age1 -0.177  -1.19  -0.447  -0.86 -0.889  -1.01 -0.178 -1.69  -0.567 -1.34  -1.378 -1.03
País Vasco*Age1  -0.115  -0.97  -0.802  -1.87 0.523 0.74  -0.212 -1.72  -0.511  -1.11  -2.966  -2.26
Andalucía*Age2 -0.105  -1.05  -0.627  -1.61 1.153 1.57  0.079 0.82 0.086  0.28  -0.231  -0.18
Aragón*Age2 0.039  0.36  -0.859  -1.91 0.830  1.06 0.153 1.23  -0.320  -0.87 -0.665  -0.46
Asturias*Age2 0.050  0.40  -0.830  -2.01 -0.226 -0.22  0.014 0.12  0.668 1.57 -1.363  -0.96
Baleares*Age2 -0.022  -0.20  -0.995  -2.36 1.025 1.05  0.044 0.42  -0.467  -0.90  -0.979  -0.73
Canarias*Age2 0.013  0.12  -0.471  -1.10 0.373 0.46  0.054 0.54 0.286  0.90  -0.835  -0.64
Cantabria*Age2 -0.050  -0.39  -0.715  -1.40 1.175 1.30  0.086 0.62  -0.594  -1.40  -0.864  -0.58
Castilla-León*Age2 -0.196  -1.77  -0.568  -1.43 0.134 0.17  -0.027 -0.23  -0.283  -0.60  -1.000  -0.70
Castilla-La Mancha*Age2  -0.073  -0.69  -0.571  -1.39 1.066 1.16  0.055 0.5 -0.359  -1.05  -0.293  -0.22
Cataluña*Age2 -0.005  -0.04  -0.698  -1.72 -0.130 -0.15  0.106 1.14 -0.041  -0.13  -0.264  -0.21
Com. Valenciana*Age2  -0.042  -0.42  -0.614  -1.59 0.281 0.40  -0.016 -0.16  0.084  0.26  -0.486  -0.38
Extremadura*Age2 -0.115  -0.94  -0.830  -1.96 0.638 0.61  0.176 1.51 0.630  1.71  1.062  0.77
Galicia*Age2 -0.018  -0.17  -0.453  -1.04 0.954 1.16  -0.028 -0.26  -0.060  -0.18  0.016  0.01
Madrid*Age2 0.074  0.74  -0.714  -1.82 0.679 1.00  0.168 1.73 0.022  0.07  -0.984  -0.78
Murcia*Age2 -0.037  -0.34  -0.682  -1.69 0.454  0.59 -0.045 -0.37  -1.105 -2.61 -1.266  -0.93
Navarra*Age2 -0.084  -0.57  -0.451  -0.93 -0.347 -0.35  -  -  -  -  -  - 
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TABLE A.1 Main Results for the Exit Rate from a Temporary Contract (Part III) 
 Men  Women 
  Unemployment  T.C Same Firm  P. C. Same 
Firm  Unemployment  T.C Same Firm  P. C. Same Firm
 Coef.  t-S  Coef.  t-S  Coef.  t-S  Coef.  t-S  Coef.  t-S  Coef.  t-S 
Andalucía*(y1995-y1996) 0.391  3.02  0.087  0.12  0.482 0.40  -0.075 -0.48 -1.006 -2.96  1.497  1.34 
Aragón*(y1995-y1996) 0.262  1.99  0.453  0.58  1.095  0.85  -  -  -  -  -  - 
Asturias*(y1995-y1996) 0.269  1.85  0.576  0.76  0.550 0.41 0.217 1.33 -0.654 -1.62  1.829  1.41 
Baleares*(y1995-y1996) 0.314  2.26  -0.101  -0.13 1.098 0.75  -0.039 -0.25 -0.965 -2.12  1.699  1.37 
Canarias*(y1995-y1996) 0.128  1.00  0.613  0.82  0.452 0.36  -0.236 -1.52 -0.356 -1.00  1.871  1.67 
Cantabria*(y1995-y1996) 0.281  1.83  0.209 0.28  0.698  0.53  -  -  -  -  -  - 
Castilla-León*(y1995-y1996) 0.534  4.05  0.687  0.92  0.561 0.38  -0.252 -1.37 -0.906 -1.70  1.450  1.27 
Castilla-La Mancha*(y1995-y1996)  0.171  1.33  0.646  0.88 1.218 0.97  -0.172 -1.08 -0.727 -1.95  2.410  2.21 
Cataluña*(y1995-y1996) 0.291  2.35  0.871  1.18  0.117 0.09  -0.146 -0.93 -0.691 -1.91  1.080  1.02 
Com. Valenciana*(y1995-y1996)  0.272  2.17  0.386  0.52 0.310 0.25  -0.159 -1.05 -0.800 -2.42  1.230  1.11 
Galicia*(y1995-y1996) 0.245  1.95  0.559  0.74  0.807 0.62  -0.129 -0.74 -1.562 -4.18  1.499  1.34 
Madrid*(y1995-y1996) 0.337  2.66  0.395  0.54  0.703 0.59  -0.268 -1.57 -1.540 -4.11  1.888  1.61 
Murcia*(y1995-y1996) 0.394  2.85  0.548  0.74  0.104 0.09  -0.293 -1.83 -0.728 -1.74  1.535  1.19 
Navarra*(y1995-y1996) 0.375  2.30  1.013 1.31  0.333  0.23  -  -  -  -  -  - 
País Vasco*(y1995-y1996)  0.403  3.12  0.424  0.56  1.039 0.83  -0.013 -0.09 -0.910 -2.70  0.078  0.06 
Andalucía*(y1997-y2000) 0.176  1.95  -0.341  -1.36 -0.062 -0.12 -0.047 -0.57 -0.367 -0.95  -0.209  -0.209
Aragón*(y1997-y2000) 0.148  1.58  -0.110  -0.42 0.422 0.83  -0.029 -0.32 -0.181 -0.47  0.096 0.096
Asturias*(y1997-y2000) 0.290  2.69  -0.412  -1.47 0.015 0.02 0.076 0.84 -0.588 -1.49  0.110 0.110
Baleares*(y1997-y2000) 0.159  1.72  -0.179  -0.68 0.061 0.10  -0.292 -3.59 -0.699 -1.53  -0.054  -0.054
Canarias*(y1997-y2000) 0.064  0.71  0.069  0.27  0.600 1.20  -0.132 -1.67 -0.423 -1.12  -0.288  -0.288
Cantabria*(y1997-y2000) 0.113  1.08  -0.103  -0.31 0.803 1.15  -0.165 -1.55 -0.460 -1.02  0.507 0.507
Castilla-León*(y1997-y2000) 0.160  1.71  -0.202  -0.80 0.379 0.70  -0.157 -2  -0.319 -0.82  -0.229  -0.229
Castilla-La Mancha*(y1997-y2000)  0.144  1.61  -0.276  -1.05 0.528 0.92  -0.058 -0.7 -0.420 -1.07  -0.018  -0.018
Cataluña*(y1997-y2000) 0.121  1.39  -0.049  -0.20 0.366 0.79  -0.115 -1.55 -0.462 -1.21  0.352 0.352
Com. Valenciana*(y1997-y2000)  0.095  1.09  -0.081  -0.33 0.153 0.33  -0.147 -1.91 -0.475 -1.25  -0.425  -0.425
Extremadura*(y1997-y2000) 0.186  1.91  -0.174  -0.59 0.078 0.12 0.091 0.9 -0.170 -0.38  0.135 0.135
Galicia*(y1997-y2000) 0.154  1.71  0.036  0.13  0.450 0.86  -0.095 -1.21 -0.552 -1.46  0.240 0.240
Madrid*(y1997-y2000) 0.226  2.52  -0.375  -1.47 0.473 0.93  -0.096 -1.2 -0.663 -1.73  0.298 0.298
Murcia*(y1997-y2000) 0.102  1.07  -0.321  -1.20 0.218 0.44  -0.079 -0.87 -0.506 -1.14  0.347 0.347
Navarra*(y1997-y2000) 0.175  1.66  -0.085  -0.25 0.058 0.11  -0.156 -1.49 -0.524 -1.20  -0.931  -0.931
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TABLE A.1 Main Results for the Exit Rate from a Temporary Contract (Part IV) 
 Men  Women 
  Unemployment  T.C Same Firm P. C. Same 
Firm  Unemployment T.C Same Firm  P. C. Same Firm
  Coef. t-S Coef.  t-S  Coef.  t-S  Coef.  t-S  Coef.  t-S  Coef.  t-S 
Ln(t) 3.052 129.07  3.617 63.63 3.967 15.45 3.280105.870 3.782 51.820 4.002 15.980
Ln(t)^2 -0.711 -101.48  -0.913 -53.54 -0.842-13.67 -0.748-77.670 -1.032 -36.730 -0.893 -13.300
t<=3   1.302 80.34  1.268 30.52 1.499 11.51 1.426 70.890 1.402 23.600 1.458 10.560
t=6 0.797 42.49  0.515 10.93 1.289 13.98 1.051 41.440 0.830 15.480 1.202 12.830
t=12 0.719 26.98  0.443 6.49 1.286 10.80 1.146 29.160 1.080 10.600 1.559 11.520
t=24 0.699 13.90  0.650 3.20 1.156 3.78 1.002 15.600 1.204 4.030 1.104 2.520
t=36 2.037 30.95  3.499 22.93 3.255 10.53 1.583 15.550 2.996 7.060 2.446 3.580
Industry -0.181 -16.56  0.374 9.50 0.202 2.39 -0.072 -4.620 0.787 16.610 0.306 3.410
Construction -0.177 -15.16  0.652 19.14 -1.034-11.46 -0.209 -7.810 -0.182 -1.680 -0.553 -2.200
Quarter 1  -0.236 -18.15  -0.674 -18.94 -0.434 -4.41 -0.231-12.770 -0.499 -11.740 -0.219 -2.180
Quarter 2  -0.086 -7.03  -0.415 -12.36 -0.275 -3.31 0.129 6.880 -0.222 -5.910 -0.130 -1.300
Quarter 3  0.052 3.88  -0.325 -10.95 -0.100 -1.29 0.292 18.870 -0.133 -3.700 0.082 1.010
Unemployment 
Rate (regional)   -0.008 -1.69 0.043 3.21 0.047 1.14 -0.013 -2.140 -0.023 -1.500 -0.013 -0.330
Part-Time Job  0.280 19.63  0.139 3.27 0.363 3.78 0.106 8.210 0.056 1.520 -0.100 -1.290
Wage Category: 
High -0.469 -25.77  -0.268 -4.17 -0.546 -3.04 -0.280-15.950 -0.083 -1.510 -0.337 -2.170
Wage Category: 
Medium-High  -0.167 -11.48 -0.290 -4.76 0.045 0.38 -0.068 -4.820 -0.067 -1.260 0.355 3.400
Wage Category: 
Medium-Low -0.052 -6.50  -0.015 -0.60 -0.008 -0.11 -0.013 -1.200 -0.092 -2.320 0.333 4.270
Inmigrant 0.083 6.83  -0.084 -2.08 -0.202 -2.01 0.113 6.300 -0.065 -1.000 0.296 2.750
Big Firm (> 100 
Employee)  -0.158 -10.91 0.311 5.44 0.288 2.69 -0.175-13.140 0.564 14.130 0.177 1.670
New Firm (one 
year old)  0.045 5.38 -0.024 -0.96 -0.068 -1.00 -0.029 -3.070 -0.044 -1.180 0.035 0.480
Private Firm  -0.093 -3.95  0.177 2.91 1.989 7.64 -0.002 -0.100 -0.001 -0.020 1.597 6.960
Constant Term  -4.571 -37.90  -10.858 -26.25 -13.947-13.83 -4.843-32.020-11.202 -21.070 -17.393 -11.810
 
Notes:  The estimation includes all the variables described in Section 5. 
            Standard Errors are adjusted for the cluster groups defined in terms of our policy variable. 
            To estimate the model, the policy variable is expressed in thousand Euros.  
            Age1 means age < 30; Age2, age=30-45 and Age3 means age>45. y1995-y2003 are year dummies. 
            Some exclusion restrictions are needed in the group of region and time interactions in order to obtain               
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TABLE A.2 Main Results for the Exit Rate from Unemployment (Part I) 
 
 Men  Women 
 T.C  P.C  T.C P.C 
 Coef.  t-s  Coef.  t-s  Coef. t-s Coef.  t-s 
Dijt*Age1 0.000  -0.03  0.010  1.56  -0.015 -2.06 0.033  1.96 
Dijt*Age1^2 -0.001  -1.18  -0.001  -0.49  0.001 1.85 -0.003  -2.56 
Dijt*Age2 0.014  1.08  0.017  0.66  -0.002 -0.30 0.019  1.05 
Dijt*Age2^2 -0.001  -0.44  -0.002  -1.01  0.000 -0.23 -0.001  -0.85 
Dijt*Age3 -0.020  -1.92  -0.019  -0.57  -0.004 -0.29 -0.022  -0.73 
Dijt*Age3^2 0.001  1.85  0.002  0.66  0.001 1.06 0.001  0.39 
Djt -0.012  -0.65  -0.025  -0.45  0.017 0.69 -0.048  -0.78 
Age 0.094  22.38  0.175  19.47  0.069 17.80 0.141  14.91 
Age^2 -0.001  -20.76 -0.002  -16.16  -0.001 -15.74 -0.002  -12.14 
y1995 -0.227  -0.81  -2.039  -2.21  -0.527 -2.12 -1.447  -2.13 
y1996 -0.037  -0.22  -1.664  -4.13  -0.485 -2.07 -0.629  -1.83 
y1997 -0.246  -2.50  -0.893  -3.27  -0.021 -0.16 -0.233  -0.99 
y1998 -0.162  -1.75  -0.557  -2.10  0.043 0.37 -0.142  -0.65 
y1999 -0.125  -1.38  -0.369  -1.41  0.124 1.15 0.282  1.39 
y2000 -0.115  -1.31  -0.379  -1.49  0.086 0.83 0.281  1.52 
y2001 -0.054  -1.62  0.107  1.86  -0.108 -2.12 0.216  3.11 
y2002 -0.068  -2.16  0.049  0.67  -0.104 -2.98 -0.026  -0.33 
y2003 -0.039  -1.17  -0.010  -0.15  -0.025 -0.56 0.012  0.17 
y1995*Age1 -0.405  -1.71  0.385  0.45  -0.424 -2.70 0.282  0.45 
y1996*Age1 -0.436  -6.56  -0.018  -0.14  -0.359 -3.03 -0.228  -1.39 
y1997*Age1 -0.327  -7.67  0.123  1.49  -0.304 -4.85 -0.288  -2.68 
y1998*Age1 -0.271  -7.31  0.115  1.46  -0.228 -4.70 -0.068  -0.62 
y1999*Age1 -0.231  -5.42  0.148  1.57  -0.183 -4.01 -0.151  -1.45 
y2000*Age1 -0.202  -5.71  0.194  2.27  -0.057 -1.36 -0.030  -0.44 
y2001*Age1 -0.161  -4.39  0.173  2.49  -0.169 -3.19 -0.021  -0.27 
y2002*Age1 -0.114  -3.35  0.158  1.91  -0.187 -5.02 0.126  1.47 
y2003*Age1 -0.073  -1.95  0.283  3.96  -0.169 -3.60 0.067  0.86 
y1995*Age2 -0.215  -0.83  0.006  0.01  -0.390 -2.10 0.397  0.61 
y1996*Age2 -0.188  -2.69  -0.136  -0.96  -0.217 -1.78 -0.243  -1.40 
y1997*Age2 -0.121  -2.96  -0.046  -0.50  -0.197 -3.00 -0.204  -1.78 
y1998*Age2 -0.151  -4.01  -0.254  -2.78  -0.149 -2.86 -0.218  -1.86 
y1999*Age2 -0.100  -2.25  -0.147  -1.53  -0.122 -2.45 -0.315  -2.86 
y2000*Age2 -0.074  -2.01  -0.032  -0.35  -0.022 -0.51 -0.110  -1.53 
y2001*Age2 -0.081  -2.19  0.119  1.58  -0.074 -1.29 -0.039  -0.45 
y2002*Age2 -0.033  -0.95  0.055  0.66  -0.129 -3.06 0.122  1.40 
y2003*Age2 -0.024  -0.68  0.162  1.89  -0.121 -2.30 0.060  0.74 
Age1 0.272  1.11  0.066  0.17  0.120 0.77 0.383  0.82 
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TABLE A.2 Main Results for the Exit Rate from Unemployment (Part II) 
 
 Men  Women 
 T.C  P.C  T.C P.C 
 Coef.  t-s  Coef.  t-s  Coef. t-s Coef. t-s 
Andalucía -0.027  -0.11  -1.525 -4.05  -0.423 -2.42 -1.113  -2.30
Aragón 0.154  0.62  -0.086 -0.23  -0.058 -0.42 0.156 0.35 
Asturias 0.135  0.54  -0.718 -1.88  -0.297 -1.94 -0.674  -1.30
Baleares -0.139  -0.56  -0.143 -0.39  -0.286 -2.01 0.384 0.87 
Canarias -0.156  -0.62  -0.568 -1.57  -0.277 -1.76 -0.059  -0.13
Cantabria 0.246  0.98  -0.671 -1.53  -0.228 -1.24 0.113 0.21 
Castilla-León 0.087  0.35  -0.792 -2.16  -0.612 -4.08 -0.648  -1.43
Castilla-La Mancha  0.043  0.17  -0.663 -1.84  -0.119 -0.83 -0.309  -0.68
Cataluña -0.128  -0.52  -0.140 -0.39  -0.178 -1.19 0.075 0.17 
Comunidad Valenciana  -0.039 -0.16  -0.464 -1.34  -0.343 -2.38 -0.227  -0.51
Extremadura 0.033  0.13  -2.636 -5.65  -0.907 -4.47 -1.663  -2.98
Galicia -0.195  -0.78  -0.960 -2.64  -0.181 -1.23 -0.552  -1.16
Madrid 0.072  0.29  -0.112 -0.33  -0.143 -1.03 0.474 1.09 
Murcia -0.004  -0.01  -0.325 -0.91  -0.319 -2.16 -0.298  -0.66
Navarra 0.039  0.15  -0.357 -0.80  0.096 0.57 0.516 1.08 
País Vasco  -0.003  -0.01  -0.504 -1.40  -0.069 -0.48 -0.114  -0.26
Andalucía*Age1 -0.031  -0.13  0.273  0.71  0.201 1.31 0.050 0.11 
Aragón*Age1 -0.108  -0.43  -0.186 -0.45  0.229 1.46 -0.141  -0.30
Asturias*Age1 -0.216  -0.89  -0.124 -0.30  0.254 1.54 0.117 0.22 
Baleares*Age1 0.108  0.44  -0.244 -0.61  0.274 1.76 -0.409  -0.89
Canarias*Age1 0.172  0.70  0.007  0.02  0.312 1.94 -0.241  -0.52
Cantabria*Age1 -0.283  -1.14  0.034  0.07  0.079 0.40 -0.547  -1.03
Castilla-León*Age1 -0.091  -0.37  0.233  0.59  0.487 3.03 0.135 0.29 
Castilla-La Mancha*Age1  -0.023  -0.09  0.154  0.39  0.107 0.68 -0.073  -0.16
Cataluña*Age1 0.113  0.46  -0.153 -0.39  0.252 1.58 -0.076  -0.17
Com. Valenciana*Age1  0.067 0.28  -0.025 -0.07  0.332 2.16 0.011 0.02 
Extremadura*Age1 -0.082  -0.34  1.469  3.12  0.549 2.85 0.427 0.78 
Galicia*Age1 0.076  0.31  0.043  0.11  0.090 0.59 -0.065  -0.13
Madrid*Age1 -0.013  -0.05  -0.135 -0.36  0.227 1.48 -0.326  -0.72
Murcia*Age1 -0.037  -0.15  -0.247 -0.64  0.233 1.49 -0.155  -0.33
Navarra*Age1 -0.029  -0.11  0.066  0.14  -0.057 -0.31 -0.586  -1.19
País Vasco*Age1  -0.005  -0.02  -0.241 -0.61  0.161 1.05 -0.226  -0.49
Andalucía*Age2 0.029  0.12  0.015  0.04  0.228 1.48 -0.264  -0.58
Aragón*Age2 0.055  0.21  -0.360 -0.88  0.239 1.52 -0.656  -1.41
Asturias*Age2 -0.075  -0.30  -0.405 -1.01  0.361 2.21 -0.248  -0.46
Baleares*Age2 0.097  0.39  -0.297 -0.75  0.338 2.17 -0.441  -0.97
Canarias*Age2 0.148  0.59  -0.115 -0.30  0.302 1.85 -0.511  -1.11
Cantabria*Age2 -0.054  -0.21  0.092  0.20  0.254 1.31 -0.654  -1.18
Castilla-León*Age2 0.053  0.21  -0.026 -0.06  0.429 2.66 -0.350  -0.75
Castilla-La Mancha*Age2  0.112  0.44  0.036  0.09  0.172 1.09 -0.301  -0.65
Cataluña*Age2 0.128  0.51  -0.261 -0.68  0.245 1.53 -0.313  -0.69
Com. Valenciana*Age2  0.095 0.38  -0.262 -0.71  0.326 2.12 -0.358  -0.79
Extremadura*Age2 -0.055  -0.22  1.060  2.25  0.638 3.30 0.079 0.14 
Galicia*Age2 0.068  0.27  -0.036 -0.09  0.210 1.36 -0.276  -0.57
Madrid*Age2 -0.004  -0.02  -0.240 -0.65  0.300 1.94 -0.596  -1.32
Murcia*Age2 0.022  0.09  -0.202 -0.53  0.177 1.10 -0.678  -1.46
Navarra*Age2 0.149  0.57  -0.248 -0.51  0.121 0.63 -0.943  -1.92
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TABLE A.2 Main Results for the Exit Rate from Unemployment (Part III) 
 
 Men  Women 
 T.C  P.C  T.C P.C 
 Coef.  t-s  Coef.  t-s  Coef. t-s Coef.  t-s 
Andalucía*(y1995-y1996) -0.310  -2.07 0.772  2.03 -0.070 -0.36 -0.155 -0.54 
Aragón*(y1995-y1996) -0.233  -1.52 0.872  2.11 -0.102 -0.54 -0.005 -0.02 
Asturias*(y1995-y1996) -0.111  -0.62 0.923  2.31 0.078 0.38 0.125  0.40 
Baleares*(y1995-y1996) -0.283  -1.79 0.839  1.90 -0.023 -0.12 -0.429 -1.17 
Canarias*(y1995-y1996) -0.206  -1.35 1.434  3.82 0.156 0.78 0.225  0.74 
Cantabria*(y1995-y1996) -0.296  -1.40 1.521  2.88 -0.178 -0.82 -0.103 -0.34 
Castilla-León*(y1995-y1996) -0.306  -2.02 0.563  1.44 0.018 0.09 0.057  0.17 
Castilla-La Mancha*(y1995-y1996)  -0.274  -1.74 1.510  3.95 0.003 0.02 0.237  0.78 
Cataluña*(y1995-y1996) -0.138  -0.92 1.155  3.07 0.064 0.34 0.068  0.25 
Com. Valenciana*(y1995-y1996)  -0.326  -2.18 1.072  2.83 -0.002 -0.01 -0.318 -1.13 
Extremadura*(y1995-y1996) -0.122  -0.67 0.641  1.62 -0.216 -1.10 0.397  0.92 
Galicia*(y1995-y1996) -0.186  -1.26 1.085  2.80 0.017 0.09 0.319  1.13 
Madrid*(y1995-y1996) -0.378  -2.54 1.043  2.76 -0.021 -0.11 -0.176 -0.56 
Murcia*(y1995-y1996) -0.356  -2.19 0.900  2.27 0.025 0.13 -0.103 -0.32 
Navarra*(y1995-y1996) -0.076  -0.49 2.007  4.48 -0.081 -0.38 0.416  1.28 
País Vasco*(y1995-y1996)  -0.146  -0.93 1.542  4.01 0.129 0.67 0.072  0.22 
Andalucía*(y1997-y2000) -0.005  -0.06 0.151  0.60 -0.453 -4.24 -0.363 -1.88 
Aragón*(y1997-y2000) 0.040  0.45  0.449  1.76 -0.311 -2.85 -0.115 -0.61 
Asturias*(y1997-y2000) 0.094  1.02  0.409  1.50 -0.421 -3.79 -0.376 -1.72 
Baleares*(y1997-y2000) 0.206  2.37  0.671  2.60 -0.130 -1.20 0.157  0.82 
Canarias*(y1997-y2000) 0.076  0.91  0.318  1.28 -0.370 -3.59 -0.313 -1.60 
Cantabria*(y1997-y2000) 0.037  0.39  0.345  1.09 -0.415 -3.39 -0.368 -1.76 
Castilla-León*(y1997-y2000) 0.003  0.03  0.246  0.96 -0.320 -3.12 -0.310 -1.46 
Castilla-La Mancha*(y1997-y2000)  0.026  0.30  0.486  1.90 -0.427 -4.11 -0.321 -1.68 
Cataluña*(y1997-y2000) 0.118  1.45  0.548  2.24 -0.303 -3.05 -0.062 -0.35 
Com. Valenciana*(y1997-y2000) 0.060  0.74  0.377  1.52 -0.364 -3.65 -0.319 -1.75 
Extremadura*(y1997-y2000) -0.025  -0.27 0.667  2.49 -0.513 -4.60 -0.198 -0.85 
Galicia*(y1997-y2000) 0.137  1.65  0.530  2.11 -0.300 -2.88 -0.356 -1.91 
Madrid*(y1997-y2000) -0.013  -0.15 0.363  1.45 -0.370 -3.56 -0.235 -1.28 
Murcia*(y1997-y2000) -0.001  -0.01 0.200  0.79 -0.368 -3.51 -0.323 -1.59 
Navarra*(y1997-y2000) 0.036  0.38  0.640  2.31 -0.367 -3.16 0.122  0.63 
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TABLE A.2 Main Results for the Exit Rate from Unemployment (Part IV) 
 
 Men  Women 
 T.C  P.C  T.C  P.C 
 Coef.  t-s  Coef.  t-s  Coef.  t-s  Coef.  t-s 
Ln(t) -0.605 -41.64 -0.606 -16.09 -0.394 -22.27 -0.224 -5.91
Ln(t)^2 0.121 14.71 0.101 5.34 0.062 7.09 -0.080 -4.27
t<=3 0.167 10.25 0.066 2.01 0.221 12.03 0.055 1.48
t=6 0.078 5.33 0.051 1.30 0.078 3.98 0.101 2.47
t=12 -0.279 -10.17 -0.054 -0.84 -0.235 -7.48 0.252 3.66
Industry 0.145 15.00 0.167 7.82 0.054 3.10 0.041 1.34
Construction 0.327 38.81 -0.546 -18.24 -0.254 -9.35 -0.266 -4.20
Unemployment Benefits  -0.649 -34.90 -0.424 -12.64 -0.692 -33.44 -0.522 -14.47
Unemployment Benefits (T=t)  0.106 8.79 0.141 6.34 0.145 8.93 0.165 5.89
Quarter 1  0.175 14.05 0.225 7.48 0.095 5.10 0.232 6.94
Quarter 2  0.404 27.42 0.189 6.97 0.411 18.90 0.195 5.99
Quarter 3  0.272 24.75 0.302 14.07 0.326 20.12 0.543 21.47
Unemployment Rate (regional)  0.006 1.13 0.039 3.32 0.017 2.14 0.047 3.21
Part-Time Job  -0.234 -24.55 -0.155 -7.43 -0.123 -14.08 -0.048 -2.15
Temporary Help Agency  0.274 20.82 -0.107 -3.04 0.232 16.43 0.039 1.26
Wage Category: High  -0.062 -2.70 0.347 8.30 0.259 14.88 0.135 3.70
Wage Category: Medium-High  -0.048 -3.13 0.184 5.69 0.066 4.59 0.092 3.67
Wage Category: Medium-Low  0.096 9.88 0.168 8.72 0.068 6.52 0.149 7.43
Inmigrant 0.183 14.40 0.156 5.68 0.132 8.05 0.218 5.80
Layoff 0.092 10.37 -0.097 -4.42 0.155 11.31 -0.045 -1.69
Big Firm (> 100 Employee)  0.019 1.71 -0.062 -2.12 0.065 5.74 -0.052 -2.39
New Firm (one year old)  0.018 2.61 -0.020 -1.11 -0.005 -0.59 0.042 2.48
Permanent Contract   -0.336 -13.79 0.661 18.99 -0.525 -17.59 0.828 20.15
Constant Term  -3.333 -12.69 -6.204 -15.83 -3.170 -19.58 -6.538 -13.90
 
Notes:  The estimation includes all the variables described in Section 5. 
            Standard Errors are adjusted for the cluster groups defined in terms of our policy variable. 
            To estimate the model, the policy variable is expressed in thousand Euros.  
            Age1 means age < 30; Age2, age=30-45 and Age3 means age>45. y1995-y2003 are year dummies. 
 
 